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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an overview of fraud, including concepts, 
trends, and controls to in turn, develop an effective assurance work plan as well as a fraud-
prevention proposal to a potential client.  When KPMG collected data from 348 of their 
company fraud investigations in 2011, an average of 87 percent were male (3). Around 
thirty-two percent of fraudsters usually worked in a finance role which gave them access 
to assets and financial statements. According to Donald Cressy’s research, it takes all three 
elements to be considered fraud: a triangle of motivation, opportunity, and rationalization. 
However, in the 2004 CPA Journal, David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson discussed 
the addition of another element from their research to create a fraud diamond, which also 
includes the individual’s capacity. Compared to public companies, fraud occurs more 
frequently in privately owned companies. Nearly 40 percent of victim organizations in the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2012 study were privately owned while 28 
percent were publicly traded. Furthermore, fraud is more likely to be detected by 
individuals in the internal or external audit setting or an anonymous tipline. These concepts 
are explained further in sections of the assurance engagement team plan and fraud-
prevention proposal to a small business owner.   
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The Expectations Gap for Auditors is driven by two factors: the auditor’s aptitude 
to detect fraud and the auditor’s efforts to detect fraud. (Zikmund).When performing an 
audit for a company, auditors are either inexperienced or not willing to spend the time and 
energy to perform the steps that stem from the red flags of auditing (Zikmund). To prevent 
fraud, all accountants, internal or external, must develop fraud detection skills and a 
mindset to discover fraud. (Zikmund). The purpose of this thesis is to present an overview 
of fraud, including concepts, trends, and controls to in turn, develop an effective assurance 
work plan as well as a fraud-prevention proposal to a potential client.   
  
Overview of Fraud   
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners first defined occupational fraud in 
2002 as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through deliberate misuse or 
misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (“Report to the 
Nations” 2). There are four elements that must be fulfilled to be considered fraud: a 
material false statement, the employee had knowledge that statement was false, the 
company relied on the statement, and the company suffered damages because of the 
activity (Wells 8). There is fine line between fraud and abuse. While abusive practices like 
surfing the internet while at work and using sick leave when not sick might cause the 
company to lose resources, they do not constitute fraud (11). Occupational fraud can be 
divided into three general categories: asset misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent 
financial statements, as shown in the fraud tree on the following page.   
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“Fraud Tree” acfe.com  
Asset Misappropriation focuses on theft of cash and the misuse of a company’s 
assets, particularly inventory (Wells 41). If a store employee has been fired and the 
manager is still reporting their payroll after their termination to pocket the paycheck, this 
is considered asset misappropriations as a ghost employee. Corruption is caused by 
wrongful acts in which fraudsters use their influence for a benefit, like bribery, conflict of 
interest and extortion (41). The Fraudulent Financial Statements category involves 
misreporting financial statements on purpose to mislead analysts, investors, or creditors 
(41). Employees can overstate assets/revenue or understate liabilities/expenses in order to 
make financial statements look more appealing to shareholders or potential investors.  
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Typical Attributes of a Fraudster  
When mentioning white-collar crime like fraud, many accountants and accounting 
students already have a predefined image in their head of the perpetrator. Big 4 firm, 
KPMG, describes the typical attributes of fraudsters to be “male, ages 35-46, in a senior 
management position” (“Profile of a Fraudster” 1). When KPMG collected data from 348 
of their company fraud investigations in 2011, an average of 87 percent were male (3). 
Around thirty-two percent of fraudsters usually worked in a finance role which gave them 
access to assets and financial statements (4). Fraudsters working in the CEO’s office or an 
operational/sales role were both just under thirty percent (4). Furthermore, over sixty 
percent of fraudsters worked in senior management position, such as chief executive (4). 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s Report to the Nations issued in 2012 
produced similar results from CFE surveys. Two-thirds of the fraudsters were male and 
the two highest percentages in age range were 36-40/41-45(“Report to Nations” 46). Data 
differed with the fraudster’s position. The position of employee had the highest percentage 
of fraudulent cases with 41 percent, compared to senior managers and top executives 
(“Report to Nations” 39). However, the average dollar amount lost from an executive 
committing fraud in the US was the highest amount at $373,000, almost seven times that 
of the median loss of employees. (“Report to Nations” 31). While fraud can be man-
dominated, women do commit fraud. A global comparison showed that women in the 
Americas (22 percent) and Asia Pacific (23 percent) are almost three times more likely to 
be involved in fraud than in Europe (8 percent) (“Profile of a Fraudster” 3). This could be 
due to fewer European women in top management positions.   
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Fraud Triangle  
While there are common attributes of a fraudster, the situational aspect of fraud is 
also important. Donald Cressy researched fraud to hypothesize “Trusted persons become 
trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is 
nonshareable and are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the 
position of financial trust…” (Wells 13). This conclusion has led to the concept of the 
fraud triangle:  motivation, opportunity, and rationalization (see graphic). Motivation is 
the perceived nonsharable financial need or “driving force” behind the act (Biegelman and 
Bartow 33). It is usually caused by greed as described by “living beyond one’s means”, 
addiction, family circumstances, or the pressure to pay debts. (33). At times, revenge, ego, 
or the pressure to perform can play an alternative role instead of greed (33). The second 
factor is opportunity, which is determined by position of authority and access to resources 
(34). Fraudsters must have the opportunity to commit fraud as a result of weak internal 
controls, lack of supervision, and/or poor ethical culture (Dorminey et al.). This is the only 
element that can be prevented if companies are proactive in their risk management, internal 
controls, and fraud prevention programs (Biegelman and Bartow 35). Rationalization 
justifies the fraudulent activity by cognitive reasoning like “I was only borrowing the 
money; This is not much money so the company won’t miss it; I’ll stop once I get over 
this financial hump; The company owes it to me, etc” (35). When fraudsters justify 
embezzling money by persuading themselves they will pay it back, this payback usually 
does not occur (Dorminey et al.). Fraudsters rationalize the fraud in order to consider their 
action acceptable.  
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Fraud Diamond  
According to Cressy’s research, it takes all three elements to be considered fraud. 
However, in the 2004 CPA Journal, David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson discussed 
the addition of another element from their research to create a fraud diamond (see graphic 
below), which also includes the individual’s capacity (Dorminey et al.). In previous major 
scandals, there has been one individual or set of individuals with the right capability, 
meaning personal traits and abilities that set everything in motion.   
 
The Fraud Triangle         The Fraud Diamond 
 
  
During a speaking engagement in 2013, WorldCom controller David Myers takes 
responsibility for his acts involving fraudulent financial statements and journal entries. Yet 
he also admits that he trusted Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan as Sullivan used his 
capacity to tell Myers and other employees to manipulate journal entries. Myers expected 
Sullivan to handle any issues if they arose (Myers). In 2005, William Black created the 
term “control fraud” by studying activities where the CEO or other top executives used the 
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organization for personal gain (734). He also provided a description for “red-collar” to 
define white-color criminals who become violent and demanding to their employees as 
they try to hide their fraudulent actions (734). While red-collar crime and control fraud 
represent extreme cases of fraud, it still relates to the broad category of the fraud diamond 
term, capacity.  
 
Magnitudes of Loss  
The biggest magnitudes of loss with fraud are related to cost and reputation even 
though the loss varies with each case. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
estimates around five percent of all revenue is lost to fraud each year (“Report to Nations” 
4). Hypothetically, if a company has a reported net revenue of one million dollars, the 
ACFE estimate predicts that $50,000 of it is lost to fraud within the company. The median 
loss based on business size will be discussed further in the ‘Trends of Fraud’ section as 
well as a Cost-Benefit Analysis for fraud prevention controls in the client proposal. The 
size of the fraud can also impact the company stakeholders’ opinion. If the company cannot 
recover their financial losses, employees might be laid off. Investors will evaluate whether 
or not they should continue doing business with the company. Lastly, the consequences 
from the fraud—i.e., employees let go, bad publicity--could change customers’ view. Even 
if the company recovers from the fraud financially, the consumer’s negative opinion of the 
company image and reputation could affect the business continuity.   
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Punishments  
Most fraudsters who are caught will have their punishments determined by the 
company, based on the notion if they decide to pursue legal actions. To summarize the 
punishments exacted on fraudsters presented in the 2012 Report to the Nations, around 
65.4 percent of fraud investigations are handed over to police (61). When Sarbanes-Oxley 
was implemented, it created and amended specific statutes fraudsters are faced with if their 
cases are prosecuted (Biegelman and Bartow 75). Convictions of certain activities like 
“Destruction, Alternation, or Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations and 
Bankruptcy” result in a fine, up to 20 years imprisonment, or both (75). The Securities 
Fraud statute provides penalties of a fine and/or imprisonment of a maximum of 25 years 
if a criminal is convicted of defrauding public company shareholders (75). The following 
table presents a comparison of convictions of two highly-publicized scandals versus a 
smaller scandal. However, it should be noted that they are roughly eleven years apart.   
Company  WorldCom  Tyco  RH Holdings(Southhaven, MS)  
Year  2002  2002  2013  
Fraud  
Amount/Type  
$3.8 billion dollars  
Financial Statement Fraud  
$600 million   
Securities Fraud   
$5 Million Dollar Loan   
Credit Application Fraud  
CEO  
Conviction  
 Bernie Ebbers convicted 
to 25 years in jail  
Dennis Kozlowski served 
8.7 years in a sentence up 
to 25 years   
Contractor James Harris convicted to 
21 months in prison and $247,467 in 
restitution  
CFO/Partner 
Conviction  
Steve Sullivan convicted 
to 5 years in jail  
Controller David Myers 
convicted to 1 year and 1 
day  
Mark Schwartz served 8.4 
years in a sentence up to 
25 years- Total both paid 
$104 million in restitution 
and $105 million in fines  
Partner Chuck Roberts served 10 
days in prison for crime  
Source   The Executive Roadmap  The Executive Roadmap  http://www.desototimes.com 
(3/29/14)  
  
As the table shows, even ten years ago, a fraud worth several hundred millions or even 
billons resulted in several years of jail time. CEO Bernie Ebbers is currently still serving 
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his 25 year sentence. In a small Mississippi town, Harris was convicted to almost two years 
of jail time for a fraud of 5 million dollars.  
Alternatively, in 2012, 34.8 percent of fraud was not referred to law enforcement 
as listed in the 2012 Report to Nations (61). As shown in the graph below, companies do 
not often report fraud because they fear bad publicity toward the company or the company 
feels their disciplinary actions are sufficient (61)  
 
“Reason(s) Case Not Referred to Law Enforcement “, 2012 Report to Nations, Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners   
  
 However, because of their reasoning, fraudsters are getting the chance to 
potentially continue their crime at another business. According to the 2014 PwC 
Global Economic Crime Survey, approximately eighty percent of fraudsters were 
dismissed from the company, yet only forty-nine percent were reported to law 
enforcement (49). Many fraudsters are essentially allowed to walk free. Since they 
were not prosecuted, nothing shows up on a pre-employment background check 
and they are able to continue their tactics at a new company.   
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Fraud in Private Companies versus Public Companies   
Compared to public companies, fraud occurs more frequently in privately owned 
companies. Nearly 40 percent of victim organizations in ACFE 2012 study were 
privately owned while 28 percent were publicly traded (“Report to Nations” 25). 
Because private companies are not regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, they have fewer protocols to follow and do not have the internal controls 
public companies do. Private companies focus primarily on the profitability and financial 
standing of their business. The Banking and Financial Services, Government and Public 
Administration, Manufacturing, Healthcare, and Education industries are the top five 
industries most susceptible to fraud (“Report to Nations” 28). Since these industries 
require a high proportion of financial reporting and accounting as well as a large number 
of employees, it is understandable they have the most cases of frauds.  
 
Fraud in Non-Profit Organizations  
While most fraud occurs in for-profit industries, there are some occurrences in the 
nonprofit sector. Around ten percent of fraud cases have been investigated in non-profit 
organizations, compared to a combined approximate of seventy percent in for-profit 
industries (“Report to Nations” 25). Theft of cash and kickbacks/bribery were the most 
common types of fraud committed in non-profit organizations with the most non-profit 
frauds occurring in organizations with very few volunteers (Buckhoff and Parham 54). 
With no volunteers, officials committing fraud can easily hide their actions as they do not 
have to worry about many people examining the non-profit finances.  
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Fraud in Churches 
Magnifying the non-profit sector, churches actually lose a large amount of money 
to fraud each year. The Status of Global Mission’s 2014 Report concluded that around the 
world, an estimated 39 billion dollars is budgeted annually for ecclesiastical crime, which 
is considered money embezzled by top custodians of religious money (29). Perpetrators 
use their personal relationships with fellow believers in the church to partake in dishonest 
activities. Since churches typically give all their proceeds to religious activities and 
missions, very little time or money is spent on internal controls. This makes it easier for 
fraudsters to gain the trust of church officials as well as gain access to the church offering 
or finances to use for their personal expense. While churches publish their financial 
statements and budgets to inform the congregation, churches are not required to be audited 
by accountants. Additionally, churches are usually tax-exempt so the IRS only audits if 
they have a notion of illegal activity ("Tax Information for Churches and Religious 
Organizations").  
  
Trends of Fraud  
Tracing Fraud over Time   
Since many fraud occurrences are not detected or not turned into legal 
investigations, the rise or decline of fraud cases over time is not clear.  According to the 
Report of Nations surveys from 1996 to 2012, fraud has been exposed as either five or six 
percent of yearly revenue. In PwC’s Global Economic Crime Survey for 2014, their 
research concluded the reported rate of economic crime around the world had increased 
from thirty percent in 2009 to thirty-seven percent in 2014 (5). In 2011, the rate was from 
the report was in the middle at thirty-four percent (5). Though, by surveying Certified 
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Fraud Examiners each year, data does show annual trends pertaining to specific details of 
fraud. As shown in the graph below, the median loss of small businesses versus large 
businesses has fluctuated since 1996. The average loss decreased until 2006, when it 
increased significantly.   
 
“Size of Victim Organization — Median Loss”, Report to the Nations, ACFE, 1996-2012  
 
The light blue line on the graphs notes the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July, 
2002, which could have had an effect on the decrease of fraud loss. Additionally, the dark 
blue line depicts the Economic Crisis in 2008. The median loss of fraud increased 
significantly around this time when companies and individuals were struggling financially.  
 
Economy’s Effect on Fraud  
  Furthermore, this data can predict that the trends of fraud are affected by the general 
economy. Shown by the dark blue line on the graph, the economic crisis of 2008, including 
the housing bubble and economic recession, impacted fraud heavily. An additional ACFE 
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survey tested this theory as they received responses in February and March 2009 from 507 
Certified Fraud Examiners. Ninety-two examiners found a significant increase in fraud and 
189 examiners discovered a slight increase (“Occupational Fraud” 5). The average dollar 
amount of fraud also increased by almost 49 percent (5). During the recession, aside from 
living beyond one’s means and financial difficulties, businesses were also faced with the 
pressure to succeed despite the poor economic circumstances. The recession study found 
that of the frauds detected at around this time, forty-nine percent happened because of 
increased pressure. (“Occupational Fraud” 6). ACFE President James D. Ratley reiterated 
this by stating “Desperate people do desperate things.” (14).   Companies must reduce 
expenses to maintain revenue and since internal controls “do not contribute to the bottom 
line”, they can be one of the first expenses to be decreased. (14).   
  
 “Types of Fraud Observed to Have Increased During Past Year,” Occupational Fraud: A Study of the Impact of 
Economic Recession  
  
However, data conflicted when researching the change in the three types of fraud 
during the Economic Crisis. The ACFE survey about the Recession showed that all types 
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of fraud increased significantly in the time between 2008 and 2009 as in the graph above 
(9). Yet when comparing the percent changes of the ACFE Report to the Nations from 2008 
to 2010 (next page), none of the categories showed dramatic increases. In fact, two types, 
corruption and financial statement fraud, decreased in percentage. Taking the survey details 
into account, this could have been caused by the difference in sample sizes and sample 
respondents.   
  
“Occupational Frauds by Category (U.S. only), Report to the Nations, 2010, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners  
  
Media’s Effect on Fraud  
Media has little impact on actual fraud but has more influence on informing the 
public after it has been detected and investigated. Unless journalists are given insider tips, 
they have no way of knowing fraud was occurring in the company until it was publicly 
announced. Once details of the fraud are released to the public, news stations can then 
report on it. Media is also impacted by the size of the fraud relative to the company.  Most 
U.S. adults could probably name top frauds that have occurred in the past ten years just 
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based on media attention.  Publicly traded Fortune 500 companies receive more commerce 
than small-town businesses; therefore, the public is more likely to be interested in the 
public companies when fraud occurs.  
 Social media could play a large role in detecting fraudulent activity by providing 
evidence on the activities of a fraudster. If a tip is turned in about an employee’s possible 
theft of company money to fuel a gambling addiction or management notices an employee 
living beyond their means, websites like Facebook and Twitter can indicate if he or she 
has visited a casino or store recently through pictures, statuses, and check-ins. Postings 
can even be traced to geographic coordinates if the settings are turned on. While it might 
be difficult to prove the crime completely off of social media, it could provide helpful 
evidence towards the fraud case.  
 
Cyber-Fraud  
Cyber-crime has a three point definition; therefore, each point represents a separate 
concept. The first part of the definition includes cyber-fraud and describes as “traditional 
crime like fraud or forgery carried out over electronic communication networks and 
information systems” (“European Commission”). The second part of cybercrime is related 
to illegal activity over the electronic media like child pornography as well the third section 
which details crimes against networks like hacking or attacking an information system 
(“European Commission”). While each point is a different way to commit crime, they are 
usually grouped together under the phrase cyber-crime. As technological activities 
increase exponentially, cyber-crime is also increasing as shown in the graphic below.   
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“Global Economic Crime Survey”, PwC, 2014  
  
Nearly all companies conduct business using technology and the internet. Trends 
of cloud computing, mobile technology, data mining, and video conferencing are quickly 
infiltrating into the business world. Technology has impacted the accounting profession as 
a large majority of businesses use Accounting Information Systems and Enterprise 
Resource Planning system, like SAP and Oracle, to automate accounting processes. As 
technology expands further into the business world, new issues, specifically in the area of 
intellectual property, arise.  Robert King is a CPA, CVA, and CFE at the consulting firm, 
The Koerber Company, in Hattiesburg, MS, which specializes in forensic accounting and 
litigation. Based on his experiences, he has realized that this is becoming a big issue 
because IT officials can relocate from one company to another and steal a company’s 
proprietary information for their own benefit (King). Since companies survive by doing 
things better than their competitor, any theft, especially intellectual property, could 
seriously impact finances.  
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          “US State of Cybercrime”, PwC, 2013  
 
 
While increased technology has provided more ways to commit fraud, the main 
perpetrators of cybercrime are disgruntled employees, hackers, and the government as 
shown in the graph on the previous page. A small percent of sources also include activists 
and organized crime.    
With automated AISs, companies can enact general and application controls for 
technology. If a company does not have these controls in place, they have a higher chance 
that fraud will be committed. If company networks do not have both physical and logical 
security measures, it can be very easy for someone without authority to gain access to 
tangible assets like inventory and intangible assets through the Accounting Information 
System. However, implementing controls specific to risk areas in the company can affect 
the occurrence of fraud.  
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Cybersecurity Initiatives   
As cyber-crime rises, the government has taken action to help prevent cybercrime. 
In the past few months, the Obama Administration issued a “Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” for nationwide security. This executive order sets 
guidelines for organizations to manage cybersecurity risks by focusing on risk assessments 
and response plans (Exec. Order No. 13636).  Furthermore, the FBI has established 
multiple task forces to help alleviate cybercrime like the National Cyber Investigative Joint 
Task Force. This special force teams up with nineteen other intelligence agencies to help 
detect cybercrime and the major culprits behind it, which are discussed in the section below 
(“National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force”)  
 
Social Demographics  
Looking at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber’s Most Wanted list, it should 
be noted that of the ten individuals on the list, most of them have similar demographics. 
All individuals were males and a majority were young adults (“Cyber’s Most Wanted”). 
Nine out of the ten were born in between 1970 and 1990 and most had some background 
in computer programming, telecommunications, or internet entrepreneurship (“Cyber’s 
Most Wanted”). The ten most wanted represent a variety of European and Middle Eastern 
nationalities. Additionally, as with the Cyber’s Most Wanted, most cybercrime occurs in 
urban areas because cybercriminals have more network access there.   
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Undetected Fraud  
When fraud goes undetected for a long period of time and is then found, specific 
aspects of the business could really be in trouble.  Fraud could seriously impact business 
continuity depending on the level of financial stability of the company. Significant 
financial losses due to fraud and fees resulting from the fraud could hurt company to the 
point of bankruptcy or acquisitions. When reporting for undetected fraud on the financial 
statements, a prior period adjustment could cover small amounts of fraud and disclose in 
the footnotes depending on the level of materiality. If the fraud will impact the financial 
statements considerably, they would need to reissue all prior financial statements for the 
years fraudulent activity occurred. A product of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board committee might also get involved with the audit and assess 
not only the company, but the external audit team responsible as well. If the fraud was 
detected early and the company needed to report a net loss for the year, they could partake 
in a deferred tax carryback or carryforward. However, if the fraud is detected too late, they 
might not have this opportunity. Public perception of the company could also be damaged 
if the fraud goes undetected for a long period of time. Customers could view it as 
irresponsible and decrease their loyalty to the company. Competitors could use it to market 
to lost customers. Many times businesses do not prosecute detected fraud once found in 
order to save reputation and prevent bad publicity.  
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Combating Fraud   
There are three main types of controls in accounting: external controls, internal controls, 
and codes of ethics.  Each type attempts to control and prevent fraud as well as errors in a 
different way by either regulations inside or outside of the company.  
External Controls   
The biggest external control that has affected the entire accounting world is the 
formation and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. President 
George W. Bush signed it on July 30, 2002 and stated, “Every corporate official who has 
chosen to commit a crime can expect to face their consequences” (Biegelman and Bartow 
68). It reinforces corporate accountability by promoting auditor independence as auditors 
must rotate every 5 years and auditors are prohibited from offering any non-audit services 
to the company (69). SOX also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
which inspects public accounting firms and the audit process for their respective 
companies (69). In addition to strengthening the independence of audit committees, 
Sarbanes-Oxley requires company executives, like CEO and CFO, to verify and certify 
financial statements (69). While it is hard to tell definitively  if the number of fraud cases 
has been reduced since SOX was recognized, it has established more structured rules and 
guidelines in hopes of preventing fraud in the future.   
 The Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 also provided a turning point for 
external controls involving fraud. SAS 99 gives external auditors the “responsibility to 
plan and perform an audit to test whether financial statements are free of material 
misstatements caused by error or fraud” (Biegelman and Bartow 82). The standard focuses 
on planning/performing an audit by having brainstorming sessions and analytical reviews 
to induce skepticism about fraud or errors and identify fraud risks. When external auditors 
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find evidence of fraud, they must then report it to top management or the audit committee, 
if the fraud involves top executives (Biegelman and Barlow 89).  
  Additionally, several task forces have been created to help investigate and prevent 
major fraud from occurring. During the same month Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, Bush 
started the Corporate Fraud Task Force (Biegelman and Bartow 19). This task force was 
responsible for not only investigating all the major fraud scandals like Enron, Rite Aid, 
and Adelphia, they also were in charge of prosecuting them. When Barak Obama became 
the United States President, he replaced the Corporate Fraud Task Force with the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Biegelman and Bartow 20). This new task force stresses 
the investigation and future prevention of fraud caused by the economic crisis in 2008 
(20). Likewise, the Securities and Exchange Commission started a similar task force, the 
Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force, in 2013 to help regulate financial reporting by 
public companies (Novack). Their main priority is to start a RoboCop initiative using the 
new Accounting Quality Model (AQM) to test the risk involved with earnings 
management. Craig Lewis, Chief Economist and Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, 
and Financial Innovation (“RSFI”) at the SEC, discussed that the RoboCop will be able to 
detect when a company has high book earnings with an alternative tax treatment or a high 
number of transactions that took place off the balance sheet (Novack). While the RoboCop 
program has flaws, like its reliance on financial comparisons between companies in the 
same industry, the RSFI is trying to improve upon it by incorporating word tests into the 
AQM as well. Looking at a past fraudulent filings, RSFI analysts have developed lists of 
words and phrasing choices which have been common amongst fraudulent filers and 
turned into one of the elements in the AQM test (Novack). The automated process starts 
the day after public companies turn their financial statements into Edgar (Novack). The 
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RoboCop tests the statements against the AQM and a risk score is created, which is then 
analyzed by the SEC to determine if the score is high or low on a scale of fraudulence 
(Novack). External controls, such as laws and task forces, provide general rules and 
guidelines for all companies to follow.   
 
Internal Controls  
While external controls set a foundation for rules and guidelines, internal controls 
are implemented within the company for its own benefit with risk management. There are 
three types of internal controls that focus on efficiency and effectiveness: preventative, 
detective, and corrective. Before implementing internal controls, companies should 
identify and evaluate the risks to their most valuable processes by doing an assessment. 
Each company will focus on protecting the core processes. A retail store will have 
inventory controls in place to protect their inventory and other assets. A corporation with 
large data collections will have security controls, like locked computer storage facilities, 
biometrics, and passwords. Similarly, a company who uses an Enterprise Resource 
Planning system will give each employee an account with a strong password and access 
limited to what their scope of work relies on.  
 
Internal Audit  
 Having an internal audit department that is a separate subsystem from the 
accounting department is an important function to internal controls for a company. They 
perform operational audits to evaluate financials and operations independently of what the 
rest of the company is reporting. The CFO decides what the internal audit team should 
focus on annually, based on what has been audited in the past year and what the external 
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audit team is concentrating on (Golden et al. 165). While an internal audit team can 
investigate fraud if it is detected, there is a point they must hand the investigation off to 
consultants or specialists if it reaches beyond their scope (166).   
 
Codes of Ethics  
SOX also emphasized ethical values, as each company is now required to have 
code of ethics for senior officials (Biegelman and Bartow 74).  The Code of Ethics is 
separate from a company’s mission statement, but the two could be harmonious. Walmart’s 
Statement of Ethics for all employees includes a specific clause for financial reporting:    
 
“Walmart requires honest and accurate recording and reporting of 
financial information in order to make responsible business decisions. 
All financial books, records, and accounts must accurately reflect 
financial transactions and events. They must conform to generally 
accepted accounting principles, and to Walmart’s system of internal 
controls” (“Statement of Ethics”).  
 
Despite the fact Walmart has global operations, all employees in all countries, from Chief  
Financial Officer to a cashier dealing with cash transactions, must adhere to the Statement 
of Ethics. Having a company-wide code of ethics provides ethical guidelines if an 
employee’s integrity is in question.  
 Publicly-traded manufacturer and service provider, Johnson Controls, Inc, also has 
a similar section in their code of ethics: “We ensure our books and records are accurate, 
complete and maintained according to the law and industry best practices” (Roell, 22). 
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Michael Barnes, Accounting Manager at the Johnson Controls plant location in 
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, agrees that while ethics policies provide a good base point to 
establish internal controls, they do not directly contribute to fraud prevention (“Ethics at 
Johnson Controls”). If a fraudster has the motivation and opportunity, they will find a way 
to bypass the controls, regardless of the ethics policy in place. The ethics policy also relates 
to the concept of tone-at-the-top, which expects senior executives and management to be 
models for all other employees. In his interview, Mr. Barnes also notes that tone-at-the top 
in the control environment is very accurate as having good control leadership and the 
policies in place go hand-in-hand (“Ethics at Johnson Controls”). Aside from ethical codes, 
companies also must have whistleblower protection as described in Section 806 in 
Sarbanes-Oxley (Biegelman and Bartow 263). Additionally, in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act 
was passed to give whistleblowers compensation for their relevant information (263).  
  
Assurance Opportunities with Fraud Investigation  
Difference between External Auditors and Forensic Accountants  
External Auditors and Forensic Accountants both work to detect and investigate 
material fraud, but each have their own view of the task. In this analogy, an auditor could 
be compared to a policeman and a forensic accountant investigator to a detective (Golden 
et al. 22). An audit team analyzes financial statements for a company they have a contract 
with.  In their audit plan, they have specific steps to take to test for risk of fraud. A forensic 
accountant usually is certified as Certified Fraud Examiner. They could work for either a 
public firm in the Forensic and Fraud Services branch or for a consulting firm. They 
specialize in fraud investigations and putting in controls to prevent future fraud risks. This 
topic is further explained in the Work Plan subsection later on in this section.  
Trout   24 
 
   Fraud Investigations vary in cost on a case-by-case basis. Linda Trifone, Director at  
BKD, LLP and Certified Fraud Examiner, gives an example of an actual case that had 
fraud dating back 36 months and involved around $500,000 in stolen funds from the fraud 
(Trifone).  The accounting and legal costs to investigate were over $100,000 (Trifone). At 
a consulting firm, the typical costs for services around $3,500 to 12,000 based on billable 
hours (King). For fraud cases, a retainer is used to collect fees upfront (King). Cost can be 
a deterrent for a fraud investigation and will be discussed later on in the Work Plan section.   
Impact of Big Data on Fraud Investigation  
Since more and more companies are collecting data and storing it in data 
warehouses and data marts, fraud investigators have additional data to work with when 
analyzing a fraud. The concept of big data is no longer a phenomenon but a reality that 
can be used to prevent and investigate data for fraud. Investigators can use data mining to 
efficiently look for suspicious findings by sorting and querying different scenarios like 
“Round-Dollar Payments” and “Gaps, Voids, and Canceled Checks” in a database 
(Golden et al. 408). Data-mining accounts for Benford’s Law, which is the notion that 
fraudsters typically use a figure that begin with the number 9. This goes against the 
assumption that the higher the number is, such as 7, 8, or 9, the less probable it will be the 
first digit value in an amount (Biegelman and Bartow 319). Additionally, as more data is 
collected and analyzed, more information goes into the ERP. This can help investigators 
if they need to do a search instead of having to search through gigabytes of unstructured 
data.   
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Work Plan for Engagement Team  
The beginning steps of a fraud investigation are 
determined by the detection method. If top management 
detects it, executives are already aware of what has 
happened. From there, they can proceed quickly with 
how they want to investigate the issue. If an internal 
audit detects it first, they must first bring the issue to 
management, who then decides how it is handled. This scenario started the WorldCom 
investigation, even though management played a role in the financial statement fraud. 
While tip hotlines are the largest way to detect, truthfulness is an issue. The reports can be 
anonymous and anyone with access to the hotline can report so it could be a more lengthy 
process to test the accuracy and truth to each fraud claim.  However, the tip could be a 
stepping stone for further investigation if it proves to be correct.   
  A typical engagement team includes a partner who assumes final responsibility, a 
manager, an industry specialist, and a number of senior, associate, and intern staff 
members (Robertson and Louwers 88). An interim engagement budget in terms of hours 
could be 160 hours with a year-end engagement budget that increases to 175 hours (88). 
Internal Control evaluation during the interim is budgeted to be around thirty hours and 
planning the engagement to be twenty-five hours total (88). It is during this time that the 
team conducts risk assessments for possible fraudulent activity. If fraud is detected at any 
time during the engagement, the scope would shift from a financial statement audit to a 
fraud investigation. The engagement team could bring in a specialist with fraud 
investigation experience, usually a CFE with independence from the company being 
Management 
Internal Audit 
Tip via Hotline 
External Audit 
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audited to make the investigation objective. This individual helps lead the team with the 
partner and to teach inexperienced staff how to investigate fraud.  
If fraud is found but it is not during an external audit, the executives can decide 
how they want to proceed. If they believe the fraud may have a major impact, they can call 
in a specialized team of fraud investigators, usually certified fraud examiners, using a 
consulting firm who focuses on forensic accounting. They could also employ a Fraud and 
Forensic Services team from a public accounting firm who they are not contracted with for 
audit services.  Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits firms from performing audit and non-audit 
services for the same company.   
Once the investigation starts, the first steps should be gaining an understanding and 
gathering information and documents about the case (Golden et al 299). The engagement 
team must then decide how to proceed with document review, identifying witnesses, and 
holding interviews. The team must make arrangements if outside legal counsel is 
requested.   
However, since a fraud investigation can be very costly, the company could 
proceed using internal audit if they were just looking for enough evidence to terminate the 
employee committing fraud (Trifone). Prosecution makes the investigation much more 
costly and in the end, the outcome of investigation might be unfavorable to the company.  
  
Trout   27 
 
Client Fraud-Prevention Proposal  
(Note: In this section, my team is presenting to a small business, a service provider, 
with less than 100 employees. A majority of the employees work within the office 
headquarters. It is assumed there is an owner, a general manager, and two assistant 
managers who share responsibility of the company.)  
For small businesses, the focus is on creating a successful and profitable company, 
so having a large variety of expensive internal controls and risk management processes is 
not feasible. Yet the lack of controls could lead to fraud. According to the ACFE’s Report 
to Nations, businesses with less than 100 employees are the most common victims of fraud 
(26). While data is skewed by the CFE report because few small businesses hire CFEs to 
investigate the fraud, their research does show in 2012 that 31.8 percent of fraud cases 
occurred in small businesses (26). This percent is up one percent from 2010 (26). Small 
businesses were more susceptible to billing schemes, check tampering, skimming, and 
expense reimbursements than larger companies with over one hundred employees (27).   
After analyzing the company, we found that it is in the small business’ best interest 
to invest in a fraud prevention program that they find is cost-effective to their net income. 
Below is our proposal to a potential client, a small business owner, of the benefits of having 
minimal internal controls to help prevent fraud. To lower costs, business owners could 
focus on one main control for each category: prevention, detection, and response. Below 
are considerations of basic internal controls that small businesses would benefit from.  
 
  
Prevention 
• Communication and Training 
• Segregation of Duties 
• Enforcing Vacation Days 
Detection 
• Anonymous phone tipline, email, or Smart phone Application 
• Police Force App 
Response 
• Fraud Response Plan 
• Identify fraud risks/ Monitoring  
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Preventative Measures  
For prevention, our first suggestion would be planning and compiling policies, 
procedures, and all other guidelines into a Company Handbook distributed to each new 
employee starting at the company. Written procedures aid in training new staff on business 
processes quickly. Newly-added procedures and controls could be communicated to 
veteran employees via continuous training session presentations or informal material could 
be distributed through a company memo. The guidelines and policies should reiterate the 
company’s zero-fraud tolerance and state the punishment exacted on the fraudster if 
caught. Secondly, the company should be structured (or restructured) to include 
segregation of duties. This control helps avoid giving employees control of an entire 
process. Essentially, one employee’s work serves as a check for another employee. 
Management should assign tasks like authorizing transactions, recording transactions, and 
maintaining custody of the assets to at least three different employees. The graphic 
describes a second-level process map for the credit approval process for a customer 
wanting the services offered by the company. Since it is a small company, owners should 
keep a map of the processes with notes on what steps each employee or department is 
responsible for.   
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The owner and general manager should also mandate vacation days in the company 
policies. One of the behavioral red flags of fraudsters is their refusal to take vacations 
(Report to Nations, 2010). They know if they leave the company for a short amount of 
time, their fraudulent activity could be detected. Mandatory vacation days would rotate the 
job tasks to another employee or manager for a few days and fraud risks or even fraudulent 
evidence could possibly be detected.   
  
Detective Measures  
In terms of detection of fraud, a method that has proven to be effective is the use 
of anonymous hotlines/tiplines. Research has shown employees and others reporting fraud 
like the anonymity and confidentiality it brings (Golden et al. 26). In 2012, tips were the 
largest way to initially detect occupational fraud in any industry with a percent of around 
43 percent, compared to management review (14 percent) and internal audit(14 percent) 
(Report to Nations 14). Over fifty percent of tips were reported through employees but it 
should be mentioned that twelve percent of tips were anonymously reported. Additionally, 
tips were best reported with organizations that had hotlines at 51 percent versus those that 
didn’t offer hotlines at 34.6 percent (17).This proves that using a tipline could increase 
management’s knowledge and detection of ethical misbehavior/complaints and potentially 
decrease fraud occurrences. Various companies specialize in their hotline services but the 
cost of the services is based on a price estimate because of customization.  A basic hotline 
provider like AnswerNet or Fraud Hotline costs around $500 to 1140 dollars annually for 
a small business of 100 employees (Andrews and LeBlanc.). The medium hotline service 
providers such as Red Flag Reporting and Lighthouse services charge a minimum of $645 
to 800 dollars for a company with 100 employees (Andrews and LeBlanc).   
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A possible suggestion would be a tipline through a smartphone or computer 
application instead of a telephone system. With technology increasing, people might be 
more susceptible to report fraud if they can use their mobile phone or tablet. Little research 
has been conducted for this idea but the average cost of developing an application with 
lower-level complexity and a small feature list is around 50,000 dollars (SAP). An example 
of a police department app that has similar features is below. Developers could link the 
application to the AIS the company uses or have each report sent directly to management 
or internal audit.   
 
MPD Tip Cell Phone Application, City of Minneapolis  
  
If a company is not collecting enough profits to have an anonymous hotline internal 
control, management should still make it understood in the policies and procedures 
handbook what to do to report a claim. The company could set up an additional phone 
number or email address just for reports or the company could direct employees to utilize 
local police department resources like CrimeStoppers hotline or the smart phone 
application posted above by the City of Minneapolis Police Department.   
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  Every company, no matter the size, should also have a fraud response plan. 
Preventative programs will not stop all fraud so a company should have a plan of action in 
place if fraudulent activity is detected. (Golden et al. 233). Below are components of the 
sample fraud policy found on the BKD website:   
 
By including this information in the employee handbook, all employees will be aware of 
the actions and consequences faced with committing fraud.  The manager and owner 
should also frequently spend a significant amount of time assessing controls for fraud risk 
and monitoring all activities. Since it is a small company, management could try to actively 
review each employee’s behavior for any red flags as well as verify finances and 
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operations.  By evaluating and monitoring specifically for fraud, management will be able 
to detect correct weak internal controls that could lead to fraudulent activity.   
  
Cost-Benefit Analysis  
In our proposal, we present to a small business who is privately owned and less than  
100 employees. Unfortunately, a company of this type does not publicly release their 
financial statements. We have used the actual financial information from ARAMARK 
Corporation in September 2006 when they employed 240,000 individuals (Hoover 53). 
ARAMARK is a private company that provides food services and uniform services. 
ARAMARK provides the food services for the campus of the University of Mississippi, 
Individually, the ARAMARK services offered to the University of Mississippi could be 
comparable to a small business. In 2006, ARAMARK’s total revenue was 11,621 million 
dollars (Hoover 53). Using the ACFE estimate of five percent revenue lost to fraud each 
year, ARAMARK would lose $581,050 of their 2006 revenue. Below in Cost-Benefit 
Analysis to reflect the results by implementing a fraud prevention program as described in 
the proposal. It should be noted that the three percent and five percent savings are 
hypothetical and not proven to be probable. The amount expensed for 2006 is also 
hypothetical and includes the cost of the fraud prevention program if executed.  
  
Benefits  Costs  
No Fraud Prevention Program- No 
Savings  
Revenue      11,621,000  
  Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to Fraud  
581,050  
Profit Margin 5.76%  Actual Revenue 11,039,950  
  Expenses 5,000,000   
  Net Income 6,360,000  
  Cost Ratio 44%  
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Benefits  Costs  
Fraud Prevention Program- 3% Savings  Revenue 11,621,000  
  Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to 
Fraud(2%)   232,420  
  Actual Revenue   11,388,580  
Program cost of $1000 expensed  Expenses 5,01,000  
  Net Income 6,388,580  
  Cost Ratio 43.9%  
  
  
Benefits  Costs  
Fraud Prevention Program- 5% Savings- 
No Fraud   
Revenue 11,621,000  
  Less: Estimated Revenue Lost to Fraud 0  
  Actual Revenue   11,621,000  
Program cost of $1000 expensed  Expenses 5,000,000  
  Net Income 6,621,000  
  Cost Ratio 43.1%  
  
By implementing a fraud-prevention program, the analysis shows the comparison 
of expenses to net revenue estimated by the amount lost by fraud decreases by almost one 
percent. As the company grows and revenue increases, they can put more money into the 
prevention program if needed or develop the smart phone application.   
  
  
Anti-Fraud Initiatives   
Global Fraud and Initiatives  
Every country deals with the element of fraud and its consequences. Using the 
Gross Domestic Product(GDP) of the United Kingdom, fraud in the public sector is 
estimated to be around $20.6 billion per year(“Annual Fraud Indicator” 8). The UK has 
also taken measures through the National Fraud Initiative to help track down fraud as well 
Trout   34 
 
as the implementation of the UK Bribery Act in 2006 (“National Fraud Initiative). The 
NFI helped trace 275 million dollars’ worth of fraudulent activity in 2010(National Fraud 
Initiative). The graph below displays how the US compares to other countries based on the 
number of corruption cases the ACFE analyzed.   
  
 
“Corruption Cases by Region”, Report to Nations,2012, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners   
Compared to the UK GDP amount, the United States GDP, with five percent of revenue 
lost to fraud as mentioned earlier, the present value US GDP from 2013($16,799.7 billion) 
would include $839 million lost to fraud. While the United States has struggled 
significantly with fraud, it does indicate that we have fewer corruption cases than other 
regions.   
  
 
  
Asia 
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15 % 
Africa 
13 % 
Latin America 
16 % 
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Kingdom  
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 Corruption Cases by Region, 2012 
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Conclusion  
In order for auditors to be able to successfully detect fraud during an engagement, 
they must be well informed on all aspects of occupational fraud. Studying and analyzing 
concepts like attributes of fraudsters, trends of fraud, cybercrime, and fraud prevention 
programs could close the Expectations Gap between auditors. In turn, this knowledge can 
help plan better for the logistical measures and processes of an engagement team who 
might have to conduct a fraud investigation.  
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